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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly affirm the 
Industrial Commission's final decision by holding that M[t]he 
Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably nor abuse its 
discretion by selecting the September 24, 1984, date for 
commencement of benefits given the progressive nature of 
plaintiff's disability and the difficulty of determining the 
exact date of maturation of [plaintiff's] disability?" 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULES 
The Statute and Rules relevant to a determination of the 
present case are: (1) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 1986); 
and (2) Rules 42-43, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, 56 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 38 (1987) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
h. Nature Of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition By the Court of Appeals 
This case arises under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. 
Charles G. Oman ("Oman") sustained an industrial accident 
on May 12, 1975. (R. at 2.) 
On March 21, 1977, a Compensation Agreement was made by 
Oman and approved by the Industrial Commission under which Oman 
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received temporary total disability and permanent partial 
disability compensation. (R. at 24.) After filing a claim on 
September 15, 1977, Oman received additional compensation. 
(R. at 27.) 
Nearly five years later in August 1982, Oman filed an 
Application for Hearing claiming additional temporary total and 
permanent partial disability compensation. Oman also claimed, 
for the first time, permanent total disability. (R. at 37.) 
Defendants Peabody Coal Company and Old Republic Insurance 
Company ("Peabody Coal") denied the claims and asserted a 
statute of limitation defense. (R. at 38-39.) 
At the first hearing on September 24, 1984, Administrative 
Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion found M[T]hat [Oman] was by no 
means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a result of 
the industrial accident . . . ," and that Oman's claims for 
additional compensation were barred by statutes of limitation. 
(R. at 411-413.) 
After placement with the Utah Division of Rehabilitation 
Services, a second hearing was held on November 14, 1985. 
(R. at 456-457.) On December 11, 1985, Judge Sumsion entered a 
supplemental Order, finding that Oman did not become 
permanently and totally disabled until.July 31, 1985. (R. at 
564.) Judge Sumsion also found that Peabody Coal was not 
liable for any further compensation benefits because Oman did 
not become permanently and totally disabled until more than ten 
years after the accident which was well beyond the six year 
statutory period of employer's liability for permanent total 
disability. (R. at 564.) 
On Oman's Motion for Review of Judge Sumsion's Order (R. at 
568-573), the Industrial Commission affirmed Judge Sumsion's 
Order except for the date of permanent total disability. 
Instead the Commission used September 24, 1984, which came from 
Oman's suggestion of medical confirmation as an alternative 
benefit commencement date. 
On April 15, 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
decision upholding the Industrial Commission's factual 
determination and selection of September 24, 1984 as the proper 
date for commencement of benefits. A copy of that decision is 
attached hereto as addendum "A". 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Defendants are dissatisfied with Oman's statement of facts. 
1. Oman was injured on May 12, 1975, when he was cleaning 
up after cave-in. While moving rocks, support timber fell on 
him. (R. at 2, 3, 89.) Judge Sumsion noted that "the accident 
is not questioned, but the extent of injuries sustained as a 
result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt." (R. 
at 408.) 
2. Following the accident, Oman continued work, digging 
out rock for "better than half a day." (R. at 90.) Later Oman 
sought medical attention from the Emery Medical Center for 
hyperventilation. No report was made of any back injury. 
(R. at 149.) 
4. About two weeks after the accident, Oman saw a 
chiropractor for his back. No records from this chiropractor 
were found. (R. at 94.) 
5. After receiving marriage counseling and other help in 
dealing with the May mine accident, (R. at 157-165), Oman 
returned to normal work life. (R. at 165.) 
6. Oman worked at the mine between June 12, 1975 and 
April 30, 1976. (R. at 24.) 
7. Oman did not see a medical doctor about back problems 
until May, 1976. After examination, Dr. N. K. Dean referred 
Oman to Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg. Dr. Soderberg performed a 
three-level back fusion in June, 1976. (R. at 167, 262.) 
8. In November, 1976, Dr. Soderberg recommended further 
surgery to determine whether there was a non-union of the 
fusion. Oman refused surgery. Thereafter, a permanent partial 
impairment rating of 25% for the back was given. (R. at 168.) 
9. On March 21, 1977, the Compensation Agreement was 
entered. (R. at 24.) 
10. In September, 1977, Oman elected to have surgery and 
wanted temporary total disability compensation retroactive to 
May, 1977. (R. at 27.) This was paid. (R. at 38.) 
11. In December, 1977, surgery was again performed to 
re-fuse the levels L-4 to S-l. (R. at 168, 192.) 
12. Oman continued to receive temporary total disability 
compensation through September 7, 1978. (R. at 33.) 
13. Contrary to Oman's representation that he attempted 
unsuccessfully to return to work and that he last worked on 
April 22, 1976, on August 21, 1978, Oman applied for a business 
license for Kelly's Bar with the State Tax Commission of Utah. 
He identified himself as the sole owner. (R. at 476-478.) 
This document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit 
D-20 and is attached hereto as addendum "B." (R. at 478.) 
14. On September 1, 1978, Dr. Soderberg noted that Oman 
was "tending bar" and lifting cases of canned drinks. Dr. 
Soderberg gave Oman clearance to return to work, including 
heavy work. Oman indicated he would continue tending bar. (R. 
at 169.) 
15. In March, 1979, Oman filed, as the owner, a State of 
Utah Sales and Use Tax Return for Kelly's Bar. (R. at 479.) 
This document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit 
D-21 and is attached hereto as addendum "C." (R. at 479.) 
16. In May, 1979, Oman was charged and pled guilty to 
permitting gambling at Kelly's Bar. (R. at 482.) This 
document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit D-24 
and is attached hereto as addendum "D." (R. at 482.) 
17. In December, 1979, Oman filed, as the owner, another 
Sales Tax Return for Kelly's Bar. (R. at 480) This document 
was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit D-22 and is 
attached hereto as addendum "E." (R. at 480) 
18. On his 1979 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman 
reported that he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar 
while his wife worked as a receptionist for Emery Medical 
Clinic. Oman reported a net profit from this business and paid 
self-employment tax for himself. (R. at 349, 356.) 
19. On his 1980 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman 
reported that he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar 
while his wife was a housewife. He reported a net profit from 
his business of $5,197 which is more than he would have 
received from disability benefits. [Disability would have been 
computed at the maximum rate of $95.33 per week for 52 weeks 
which is $4,957.16.] (R. at 357-362.) 
20. On his 1981 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman 
again reported he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar 
while his wife was a housewife. (R. at 363-368.) 
21. In August, 1982, Oman and his wife entered into a 
three year Lease Agreement with two year options to renew for 
Kelly's Bar. (R. at 480-482.) This document was marked as 
Exhibit D-23, received into evidence and is attached hereto as 
addendum "F." (R. at 482.) 
22. On his 1982 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman 
once again reported he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's 
Bar while his wife was a housewife. (R. at 369-374.) 
23. On his 1983 Federal and Utah income tax returns, Oman 
again reported he owned and was self-employed at Kelly's Bar 
while his wife was a housewife. Oman again reported a profit 
in excess of the maximum rate of disability benefits. (R. at 
375-379.) 
24. In March, 1984, while locking up Kelly's Bar, Oman's 
car was stolen. (R. at 483, 484.) 
25. In April, 1984, Oman purchased a Siroma Draw 80 poker 
machine for Kelly's Bar. When Oman failed to pay for it, he 
was sued. (R. at 485-487.) Supporting documents were marked 
and received as Exhibits D-28 and D-29 and are attached hereto 
as addenda MG" and "H." (R. at 485, 487.) 
26. In September, 1984, Oman made a report to the police 
that a vehicle was stolen at Kelly's Bar. (R. at 484.) This 
document was marked and received into evidence as Exhibit D-27 
and is attached hereto as addendum "I.M (R. at 485.) 
27. On his 1984 Federal and State income tax returns, Oman 
reported that he and his wife were self-employed at Kelly's 
Bar. However, he listed himself as the sole owner. He 
reported a net profit of $12,880, which is nearly $8,000 more 
than maximum disability benefits. Oman again paid 
self-employment tax for himself. (R. at 380-387.) 
28. The 1984 tax returns, which are the first to list 
Oman's wife as self-employed, were signed in April, 1985. (R. 
at 380.) Before then, on February 25, 1985, Peabody Coal 
notified Oman that they thought he owned and operated Kelly's 
Bar and that they felt this would disqualify Oman for permanent 
total disability compensation. (R. at 427, 428.) 
29. In November and December, 1983, Oman received numerous 
checks made out to him for Christmas trees. (R. at 493, 494.) 
In November and December, 1984, Oman received checks made out 
to him for Christmas trees. (R. at 492, 493.) These packets 
of checks were marked as Exhibits D-38 and D-37, respectively, 
and were received into evidence. (R. at 493, 494.) They are 
too numerous to include in the addendum. 
30. In 1984 and 1985 Oman owned and raced a horse named El 
Rockette. Sometimes he would travel to watch it race. 
Payments for the horse came out of -^he^Kelly's Bar checking 
account. (R. at 495-496) 
31. Oman paid for personal and family living expenses out 
of the Kelly's Bar checking account. Numerous checks were 
offered and received into evidence confirming this. (R. at 
498-499.) They are too numerous to include in an addendum. 
32. Oman regularly opened Kelly's Bar and was seen there 
regularly. (R. at 471, 516-518, 527.) 
33. When the sheriffs office needed to contact Kelly's 
Bar, they contacted Oman. (R. at 512, 513, 517.) The 
Sheriff's office was not even aware that Oman was disabled 
until they were contacted by defendants' investigator. (R. at 
516-518.) 
34. In April 1985 Oman reported to Four Corners Community 
Health Center that he "is able to do the business managing of 
the bar that the couple owns" and that "he is quite innovative 
and creative as far as money making ideas." These records are 
attached hereto as addendum "J." (R. at 460, 461, 487.) 
35. Kelly's Bar was still open as of the last hearing. 
36. The first medical opinion of permanent and total 
disability was that of Dr. Robert E. Potts on September 21, 
1984, rendered after the application was filed. (R. at 156.) 
37. The matter was never referred to a medical panel for 
an impartial evaluation. 
38. Oman did not claim that his permanent impairment for 
his back had changed from the 25% rating given by Dr. Soderberg 
in 1976. (R. at 336.) However, Oman did claim a 25% 
psychiatric impairment arising after March 21, 1977. (R. at 
336.) None of Oman's doctors who gave him a psychiatric 
impairment (Frank Dituri, Jack Tedrow, and Ronald Reuben) were 
aware of his business activities. All thought he was totally 
incapacitated. (R. at 333-336.) [Dr. Tedrow's opinion was 
received as Exhibit A-13 (R. at 462, 465) and Dr. Reuben's 
opinion was received as Exhibit A-17 (R. at 463, 465.)] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Oman's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is ill founded for 
at least three significant reasons. First, review by writ of 
certiorari is not appropriate in the instant case because 
plaintiff has failed to satisfy any justification that this 
court considers in granting such a writ. Second, plaintiff 
mischaracterizes the nature of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
affirmance of the Industrial Commission's factual 
determination. Plaintiff mistakes the nature of the Court of 
Appeal's decision, confusing the purely factual determination 
of the instant case with a supposed legal claim. Finally, 
plaintiff improperly raises, for the first time in this 
petition, the issue of benef 1t/payments in excess of ^ t_h^  
statutory maximum of 312 weeks. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SHOW ANY SPECIAL OR 
IMPORTANT REASON FOR GRANTING A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI, PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR REVIEW 
SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Plaintiff seeks review by a writ of certiorari under 
subsections (2) and (4) of Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court,asserting that the Court of Appeals decided a 
question of state law in conflict with or unsettled by this 
Court.1 Even where justification has been demonstrated, this 
Court has emphasized that "certiorari is a discretionary 
writ." Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1981). This 
Court declared that such "discretion must be used sparingly so 
as not to undermine . . . limits on the time and manner of 
appellate review." Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42. 
JThe pertinent portions of Rule 43 provide that: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following . . .indicate the character 
of reasons that will be considered:. . .(2) When a 
panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question 
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict 
with a decision of this Court;. . .(4) When the Court 
of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, 
but should be, settled by this Court. (Emphasis 
added.) Review of Judgments, Orders, and Decrees of 
Court of Appeals, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38-39 (May 4, 
1987) . 
The function of the Supreme Court is to review Court of 
Appeals decisions only where substantial issues of law exist or 
serious error has occurred. See Mast v. Standard Oil Co. of 
California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138 (1984). Faced with 
a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Oregon Supreme 
Court stated in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Board of County 
Commissioners, Etc., 584 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Ore. 1978) that: 
[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no longer to 
afford every losing litigant a forum to review errors 
said to have been committed at trial or in an adminis-
trative hearing. That function is now placed in the 
Court of Appeals. Similarly, a party asserting that 
the Court of Appeals, in turn, has erred cannot for 
that reason alone expect further review in this 
Court. The process must stop somewhere, and for most 
purposes this is at the first level of appeal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Much like this Court, Oregon has not set forth a set of 
criteria entitling a petitioner to review as of right, but 
rather, has required a petitioner to "present concrete reasons 
why the importance of an issue transcends the importance of the 
case to the litigants." Id., at 1373. Oman's petition in the 
instant case does not encompass any legal issue which might 
"transcend the importance of the case to the litigants", nor 
does it "present any concrete reason" for further review. This 
petition is better characterized as a factual issue not likely 
to be repeated. Indeed, Oman himself framed the issues before 
the Court of Appeals in terms of the limited standard of review 
for factual determinations. Oman's brief states: 
This case presents two issues on appeal from the 
Industrial Commission's final Order: first, whether 
the Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in failing to commence permanent total 
disability benefits on the last day that he was able 
to work; • . . . (Emphasis added.) 
(Oman's initial brief at 1.) 
Accordingly, as discussed in detail below, the Court of 
Appeals only reviewed the propriety of the Industrial 
Commission's factual determination of when petitioner's 
"industrial accident became progressively worse, finally 
culminating in total permanent disability." Oman v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Case No. 860189-CA at 3 (Utah App. 1987). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Industrial Commission's 
Finding of Fact, noting that Oman "did not become permanently 
and totally disabled until after the expiration of the initial 
six year period." 16. After review of the Industrial 
Commission's factual determinations, the Court of Appeals 
properly held that: 
The Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably nor 
abuse its discretion by selecting the September 24, 
1984, date for commencement of benefits given the 
progressive nature of plaintiff's disability and the 
difficulty of determining the exact date of maturation 
of the disability. 
Id. 
A. The Oman Decision Did Not Decide an Important Question 
of State Law as Yet Undecided by This Court. 
Contrary to Oman's contention that the Court of Appeals 
decided an important question of state law, as yet, undecided 
by this Court, the Court of Appeals specifically based its 
opinion on this Court's decision in Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188 (1935) in which this Court 
declared: 
. • . whether an employee is totally disabled or per-
manently disabled are ultimate matters to be decided 
by the commissioner, as is also the amount and time 
compensation may be awarded upon all the evidence. 
Id. at 197. See Oman, Case No. 860189-CA at 3. Therefore, the 
Court of Appeals' decision was not a decision creating new law, 
but was rather a decision conforming to existing law. 
B. The Oman Decision Did Not Decide a Question of State 
Law that Conflicts with a Decision of This Court. 
Oman contends that the Court of Appeals decision in this 
case conflicts with Brundage v. Granite School District, Case 
No- 85000742 (November 10, 1986) for the reason that in 
Brundage, the Commission held Mthat the permanent total 
disability did not begin until after the applicant stopped 
working . . . ." Oman's interpretation of Brundage is also 
flawed because Oman ignores the fact that the Commission and 
Court of Appeals both agreed with the factual determination 
that Oman continued to work after April 22, 1976. The Court of 
Appeals specifically upheld the factual determination that Oman 
"was not totally and permanently disabled in 1976" and that he 
"did not become permanently and totally disabled until after 
the expiration of the initial six year period." Oman, Case No. 
860189-CA at 3. 
Oman also argues that Section 35-1-67 (Supp. 1986) and this 
Court's decision in Norton v. Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 
1025 (Utah 1986) conflict with the Court of Appeals' decision 
herein. However, the Oman decision does not conflict with 
either Section 67 or Norton because: (1) Oman was not 
permanently and totally disabled until after the expiration of 
the six year statute of limitations; (2) Oman was found to have 
continued working at least until the award of benefits was 
made; and (3) Section 67 does not contain any statutory 
language requiring benefits to commence at either the date of 
injury or the last day of employment. Because Oman continued 
working, and was not "totally invalid" neither Norton nor 
Section 67 conflicts with the Court of Appeals decision. For 
this reason, the Court of Appeals was careful to address the 
relationship of both Norton and Section 67 to the facts of the 
instant case. 
- i ^ -
POINT II 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WILL NOT BE GRANTED FOR 
AN APPEAL WHICH IS BASED ON A FACTUAL 
DISPUTE. 
One of the central functions of the writ of certiorari is 
"to determine whether the inferior court exceeded its 
jurisdiction." State v. McAllister, 708 P.2d 239 (Mont. 
1985). The writ of certiorari must be preserved for issues of 
such great legal importance that review is necessary. Factual 
determinations by the Industrial Commission, as in the instant 
case, are not proper subjects of further appellate review. 
Thus, this Court's scope of review of factual findings in 
Industrial Commission cases is restricted: 
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary and capricious" 
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one 
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be displaced. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981). 
The Court of Appeals already determined that the Commission's 
findings were not "unreasonable" and not an abuse of 
discretion. Further review is not only duplicative, but also 
unnecessary. 
The major premise of Oman's argument on appeal is that he 
has not worked since April 22, 1976. To accept this, one must 
ignore the facts. A review of all the facts shows overwhelming 
support for the Commission's refusal to award benefits before 
September 24, 1984 because of Oman's continuing work history. 
In August, 1978, Oman began operating Kelly's Bar. (R. at 
476-478.) When Dr. Soderberg told him he could go back to work 
in September, 1978, Oman was already tending bar and continued 
doing so. (R. at 169.) Contrary to Oman's denials of 
ownership and operation, Oman's sales and income tax records 
between 1978 and 1984 show him as the sole proprietor of 
Kelly's Bar and self-employed there. (R. at 349-387, 
476-480.) In 1979, Oman, as the owner, was charged and plead 
guilty to permitting gambling at Kelly's Bar. (R. at 482.) 
When crimes occurred at Kelly's Bar, Oman reported them to the 
sheriff. (R. at 481-484.) Numerous checks deposited into the 
Kelly's Bar checking account were made payable to Oman. (R. at 
488-499.) Oman regularly opened the bar, was seen there 
regularly and also closed the bar. (R. at 471, 483, 484, 
516-518, 527.) When a poker machine was purchased for the bar, 
Oman handled the transaction. (R. at 485-487.) Oman even paid 
self-employment tax on himself (but not for his wife) during 
this time. (R. at 349-387.) Notwithstanding his denials, 
nearly all of this evidence came from documents Oman himself 
has signed. 
While operating Kelly's Bar, Oman reported for income tax 
purposes an average net profit of $4,242.67 per year. (R. at 
349-387.) When the personal and family expenses which were 
paid with money from Kelly's Bar are added to his net profit 
(R. at 498, 499, 552.), Oman made more money from Kelly's Bar 
than he would have with maximum disability benefits. Oman did 
so well that he engaged in an expensive hobby of owning and 
racing a horse. (R. at 495-496.) These facts do not take into 
account the money Oman earned from selling Christmas trees. 
(R. at 492-494.) Oman has not sat idly by, dependent on 
workmen's compensation benefits. He has by his own admission 
"been quite innovative and creative as far as money making 
ideas." (R. at 460, 461, 487.) 
Oman's last day worked was not April 22, 1976. Oman's 
contention that he ". . . never returned to work following the 
surgery on June 29, 1976" is not supported except with respect 
to mine work. If anything, Oman has not quit working and 
should not receive any benefits at all. Considering that Oman 
owned, operated and profited from Kelly's Bar, it is no wonder 
that the Commission did not award permanent total disability 
before September 24, 1984. Moreover, until 1984, there was 
absolutely no medical evidence to support Oman's contentions. 
Ironically, the date used by the Commission for awarding 
benefits to Oman was suggested by Oman himself. Although 
arguing for the April, 1976 date, Oman proposed September 24, 
1984 as an alternative date, (R. at 571.) To now claim that 
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Commission's 
adoption of Oman's own proposed alternative date strains 
credulity. Under any circumstance, this is not a case 
involving a decision of state law in conflict with or unsettled 
by this Court. Hence, Oman's petition for writ of certiorari 
should be denied. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT WILL NOT CONSIDER AN ISSUE NOT 
RAISED BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an issue 
not raised in the pleadings or at the trial court cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Insley Mfg. Corp. v. 
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986); Bundy v. 
Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984). 
Oman raises the issue of whether commencement of permanent 
total disability payments on some date other than the date of 
the applicants industrial accident requires payment of benefits 
in excess of the maximum statutory time limit for the first 
time in this petition. (Petition at p. 8.) Under these 
circumstances, "[i]t is axiomatic that . . . claims not 
raised by the parties . . . cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal." Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 
1983) . 
CONCLUSION 
The determination of whether an employee is totally 
disabled or permanently disabled is a factual matter which must 
be ultimately decided by the Industrial Commission. Because 
each case is unique, the Industrial Commission must exercise 
its discretion in making such factually governed decisions. In 
the instant case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the 
Commission "did not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion" 
in determining the factual issue that petitioner did not become 
totally disabled until years after his industrial injury. 
Thus, the petition fails to demonstrate any legal decision 
by the Court of Appeals which either creates new law, conflicts 
with current law, or necessitates a decision by this Court. 
For these reasons, Oman's petition should be denied. 
DATED this ^Otf\day of June, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
CNRY 
'LARRY <£. LAYC&CK 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Peabody Coal Company and Old 
Republic Insurance Company 
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendants Peabody Coal 
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Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Second Injury Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
DABNEY & DABNEY 
136 South Main 
Suite 412 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Charles G. Oman, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Peabody Coal Company, Old 
Republic Insurance Company and 
Second Injury Fund, 
Defendants. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood and Bench. 
A 
OPINION 
Case No. 860189-CA 
F I L E D 
APR 151987 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Cier* of me Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff seeks modification of an order by the 
Industrial Commission awarding him permanent total disability 
benefits. The benefits were to commence as of September 24, 
1984, the date permanent total disability was first medically 
confirmed. Plaintiff urges benefits should commence from 
either the day of the industrial accident (May 12, 1975) or the 
day after he last worked for the employer (April.22, 1976), 
whichever is later. Under that theory benefits would commence 
as of April 23, 1976. Plaintiff also seeks payment of interest 
on the benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. 
Plaintiff was injured inajniiig^caye-in on May 12, 1975 
in Huntington, Utah, while wp*lcing for peabody Coal Company 
("Peabody"). He was treated orthoped^eally for back problems 
and also received treatment s£^r dejxeession. He returned 
to work on June 15, 1975, but continued to receive medical 
treatment. On June 29, 1976, a three level fusion operation 
was performed on plaintiff, and in December, 1977, further 
surgery occurred, re-fusing plaintiffs back. Plaintiff was 
awarded compensation for a 25% permanent partial impairment of 
the whole body for his back problems on March 21, 1977. 
On June 11, 1982 plaintiff applied for a permanent total 
disability award because of psychiatric impairment. 
Plaintiffs total disability was confirmed by a letter dated 
ADDENDUM A. 
September».9, 1984, from his physician. The doctor's 
confirmation was corroborated by other medical and mental 
healtlj professionals. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in 
"accordance-yith Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986), made a 
^ tentative finding of permanent total disability and referred 
' » '^plaintiff ;tb the Division of Rehabilitative Services for 
:-. evaluation, training and certification. The Division found 
-v"^that filayntiff could not be rehabilitated for employment. The 
^ALiCfiofrered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order 
providing plaintiff with benefits from July 21, 1985, the date 
of certification by the Division of Rehabilitation. No 
interest on unpaid benefits was awarded. Plaintiff then filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the 
commencement date of benefits and failure to order payment of 
interest. In response the Industrial Commission denied payment 
of interest but changed the benefit commencement date to 
September 24, 1934, the first d?te of medical confirmation. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that benefits should 
commence from April 23, 1976, the day after plaintiff's last 
day of work for Peabody. Plaintiff cites Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-64 (1986) as mandating commencement of workers' 
compensation no later than three days after the injury. 
However, that section deals with total temporary disability 
rather than total permanent disability as in this case. Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986) also uses "at the time of injury-
language to establish benefits, but only in conjunction with 
wages at the time of injury. There is no statutory language 
requiring benefits to commence at either the date of injury or 
the last day of employment, whichever occurs later. Therefore, 
plaintiff's argument is without merit. Thus, this Court must 
determine if the Commission's order was supported by 
substantial evidence and was a reasonable exercise of the 
Commission's discretion. Norton v. Indust. Commission. 728 
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet 
Management/ 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). 
In this instance, while the accident causing the initial 
injury occurred in 1975, it was not until years later that the 
injury developed to a point of total disability. The ALJ 
considered evidence that plaintiff had operated a business and 
received income between 197 6 (when he stopped working for 
Peabody) and 1984. The ALJ's findings state that "[a]11 of the 
evidence presented by the defendants was convincing in showing 
the [plaintiff] is far from being totally invalid." Benefits 
were awarded nonetheless, consistent with the standard referred 
to in Norton. 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Court 
stated that a worker may receive benefits who is not completely 
incapacitated but is sufficiently handicapped so "that he will 
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor 
market." Norton. 728 P.2d at 1027. Plaintiff was not totally 
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and permanently disabled in 1976. His psychiatric problems, 
which emanated from the 1975 industrial accident, became 
progressively worse, finally culminating in total permanent 
disability. As found by the ALJ, •[plaintiff] did not become 
permanently and totally disabled until after the expiration of 
the initial six year period." The Industrial Commission did 
not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion by selecting the 
September 24, 1984, date for commencement of benefits given th 
progressive nature of plaintiff1s disability and the difficult 
of determining the exact date of maturation of the disability. 
A possible gap between full development of the disability and 
payment of benefits will not justify reversal. Booms v. Rapp 
720 P.2d 1636 (Utah 1986). We concur in the language of 
Spencer v, InflUStt Commission/ 87 Utah 336 40 P.2d 188 (1935): 
...whether an employee is totally disabled 
or permanently disabled are ultimate matters 
to be decided by the commissioner, as is also 
the amount and time compensation may be 
awarded upon all the evidence. Id. at 197. 
It is within the sound discretion of the Industrial 
Commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for 
total permanent disability so long as the determination is 
supported by substantial evidence and not patently 
unreasonable. Substantial evidence existed in this case for 
commencing benefits as of the first date of medical 
confirmation of permanent total disability. 
Plaintiff also appeals from the Industrial Commission's 
denial of interest on unpaid benefits. Plaintiff relies on 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) which states: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% 
per annum from the date when each benefit 
payment would have otherwise become due 
and payable. 
In Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1985) the Utah Supreme Court held that this statute must be 
retroactively applied to accrued or pending actions because its 
intent is remedial. The case before us clearly falls within 
the statutory language and pursuant to Marshall enactment of 
the statute subsequent to the injury or disability is 
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irrelevant* Plaintiff is entitled to payment of accrued 
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing from September 24, 
1984. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. No costs awarded. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff/ Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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This lease agreement rade and entered into this 1st day of August, 19i:, t\ 
and between Paul B. Leonard & Violet Leonard, husband 6 wife, & Robert B. Leonard 
& Golda Leonard, husband & wife, Castle Dale, Emery County, State of Utah, herein-
after referred to as Lessors and Charles Oman & Ilene Oman, Castle Dale, Emery 
County, State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as Lessee, 
WITNESSETH 
1. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY LEASED: That the Lessor does by these presents 
lease to the Lessee the following described real and personal property, to occupy 
and use for business purposes, to-wit: 
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, Block 11, 
Castle Dale Townsite Survey, thence East 12 feet; thence 
South 6.5 rods; thence West 44.5 feet; thence North 6.5 
rods; thence East 32.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
COMMONLY known as Kelly's Pool Hall located at 56 East 
Main Street, Castle Dale, Utah, together with all 
furniture, fixtures and equipment located therein. 
2. TERM OF LEASE: The term of this lease shall be from August 1, 1962 to 
July 31st, 1965, unless terminated by mutual agreement of the parties or otherwise. 
Lessee shall have two (2) year option with 20% increase in rent if option excercised 
3- LESSEES COVENANT: 
(a) The lessee shall take good care of the property and its fixtures, 
and operate the business in a good and businesslike manner; keep the plumbing works, 
closets, pipes and fixtures belonging thereto in good repair, and at the end or 
other expiration of the term, deliver up the premises in good order and condition, 
natural deterioration and damage by fire only excepted. 
(b) To pay to the lessor at Castle Dale, Utah, a monthly rental of $850.0C 
per month for thirty-six months beginning August 1st, 1982. Thereafter, the Lessee 
shall have an option to lease for another twenty-four months with the rent to be 
$1,020.00 per month. 
ADDENDUM F. 
(c) The Lessee expressly agrees that the Lessor shall be free from all 
liabilities and claims for damages and/or suits for or by reason of injury or 
injuries to any person or persons or property of any kind whatsoever, whether the 
person or property of Lessee, his agents or employees, or third persons, from any 
cause or causes whatsoever while in or upon said premises or any part thereof 
during the term of this lease or occasioned by any occupancy or use of said prer.ises 
or any activity carried on by Lessee in connection therewith, and Lessee hereby 
covenants and agrees to indemnify and save harmless the Lessor from all liabilities, 
charges, expenses (including counsel fees) and costs on account of or by reason 
of any such injuries, liabilities, claims, suits or losses however occurring or 
damages growing out of same. 
(d) Lessee shall obtain all necessary licenses and permits from the City, 
State, and Federal Governments necessary or required for the operation of the 
business herein leased. 
(e) Lessee further agrees to pay all utilities, including but not limited 
to gas, electricity, water, and sever, from August 1, 1982 to the end of the 
lease period, before any said billings become delinquent. 
(f) Lessee agrees to hold Lessor harmless for any indebtedness incurred 
by the business after August 1, 1982. 
(g) Lessee further agrees not to sub-lease or assign this lease to anyone 
during the term hereof, except upon the written consent of the Lessor. 
(h) Excessive intoxication or failure to keep the business operating with 
regular business will terminate this lease. 
4. LESSORS COVENANT: 
(a) That the Lessee, paying the rents and performing the covenants herein 
contained, shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the said leased premises and shall not 
be disturbed by an act of the Lessor or any person claiming under him. 
(b) Lessor agrees t maintain and keep in repair the roof of said buildin 
only, all other repairs and maintenance to be the responsibility of Lessee. 
5. It is mutuall) underst : d and agreed that Lessor shall have the right tc 
enter upon the leased premises at all reasonable time to inspect the same. 
6. Upon the termination of this lease for any reason, Lessee agrees to 
surrender the leased property in substantially its condition as of the date of this 
lease, and Lessor agrees to purchase the Lessee's inventory on hand at cost tc 
Lessee. 
7. In the event the Lessors shall sell the leased premises anytime during 
the time this lease is in effect, Lessors agree to make the sale subject to this 
lease. 
8. This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, 
and assigns of the parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS VKERECF, the parties have hereunto set their hands the day and 
year first above written. 
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He also took vallium several years ago, which seemed to be 
effective with him. 
PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY: 
Approximately 10 years ago prior to the mine accident, Mr. 
Oman was having some psychiatric problems and was seeino Nells, 
Bather. 
ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS AND ASSETS: 
Strengths that the client has include his abilitv to be able 
to come in contact and verbalize his feelinqs and another 
strength is that he is able to do the business managing of the 
Bar that the couple owns, and he is Quite inovative and creative 
as f^r as money making ideas. 
Weaknesses that the client has include his loss of self 
esteem, and loss of being the wage mmmmr of his family, the 
duration that this client has experienced in the lack of suDDort 
from financial and rehabilitative resourses. 
RELEVANT PAST HISTORY: 
Charles Oman is a 41 year old Caucasian male, who is coming 
into the Center at this time seeking psychiatric treatment. He 
indicates that as a result of a mine cave in ten years ago on May 
l£th that he has had a broken back with two fusions, experience?* 
severe back pain, has been on pain pills that he is not able to 
afford so instead ufces alcohol. He experiences muscle soasms and 
is unable to walk or sit or sleep for any length of period. He 
indicates that he recalls the mining accident Quite often, he 
cannot bear to watch mrty movies involving pain or violence, he 
has dreams of the cave in, he has a son in law who had a cave in 
a year and a half ago and is on disaoility, which relives a lot 
of the feelings that Mr. Oman is experiencing at the present 
time, also death mnd accidents and some discussions of the coal 
mines are upsetting to him. When he wakes up in the morning, he 
exoeriences cold sweats and dry heaves. 
As a result of the compensation hearing in November, tne 
judge recommended that he be rmfmrrwtd in to Vocation 
Rehabilitation, which he has done over the last few weeks. Mr. 
Staley has set up a tutoring program with Mr. Oman as ne is 
unable to read. Mr. Oman is terrified that someone will find out 
about this and he is V9ry secretive of the tutor coming to his 
home. He is also fearful that he won1t do good enough. Mr. Staley 
indicated* to Mr. Oman that he would be able to help get his 
daughter into tHm T *•*<*• T*eh i* e*i+ i ML*- • — — - -
INITIAL CLIENT ASSESSMENT 
NAME: Charles Oman 
DATE: 4-I9-S5 and 4-23-85 
PAGE: three 
had given the impression to Mr. Oman, that perhaps this coulc not 
be done and Mr. Oman is feeling the burden of somehow getting his 
©aughter into the Trade Tech College, without him making any 
income. Apparently the couple is experiencing great financial 
difficulty and have not been able to pay the original lease on 
their business and have had to oay a reduced lease. The lease 
«mill be up in August at which time they will need to make a 
decision whether to keep their business. 
Mr. Oman is also exo€»riencing marital conflict with his wife 
who is running the Par for him. He indicates that he does not 
care for her down there, it is very upsetting to see her 
socializing with the wale patrons, she indicates that she tries 
not to come on overly aoo€»aling to her clientale, however, this 
is a very sensitive subject for them. Mr. Oman manages the 
business end of the bar nrid is Quite creative in developing ways 
of bringing in parties, groups, etc. 
Mr. Oman was born and raised out of state and when he was in 
the tenth grade he dropped out of school due to it being so 
difficult for him. Apparently his mother was an invalid wno 
spent a great deal of time at home, and he stayed at home to care 
for nis mother and no one aooarently checked on them. His father 
was a coal miner who was gone lengthy hours during the day witn 
working in the coal mine and traveling etc. 
This is the first marriage for Mr. and Mrs. Oman. The 
couolee have three children, one who is married and lives in the 
area, a daughter who is 17, and a son who is 6 years old. 
MENTAL STATUS: 
Mr. Oman is a handsome Caucasian male who looks oldser than 
his 41 years, although he attempts to sit still during the 
conversation, he needs to get up and walk around due to tne pain 
that he is experiencing. His face shows a great deal of strain 
and worry. Mr. Oman has difficulty recalling dates and some 
experiences that has happened several years ago. He is onenteo 
as to time and place. 
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION: 
309.81, Post traumatic stress Disorder, chronic. 
The reason that the client has been given this diagnosis is 
that he has been involved in a serious mine cave in ten years ago 
whicn has left him Disabled. he has recollections of the 
accident, he relives his own trauma and experiences as a result 
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ago, which has left him disabled. His compensation is Peine) 
threatened as well. Mr. Oman will not watch movies that have to 
do with pain, death, violence, news of any accidents are very 
upsetting to him and even some coal mine discussion is upsettmc 
to him. He experiences cold sweats and dry heaves. 
Other diagnosis is £96.33, Major depression recurrent witn 
Melancholia. 
The reason that the client has teen catagorireds in tnis 
area is that he does have a dysphoric mood and has lost interest 
in his usual daily activities. He experiences sleeo 
difficulties, psychomotor agitation, feelings of worthlessness, 
guilt for bringing on the burden that he has to his family, he 
indicates being more emotional, and has difficulty in 
concentration, he also experiences social withdrawal, where ouite 
frecuently when transoortation permits he will leave the area for 
several hours or a couple of oavs to be alone. 
Another diagnosis: 3$$.$2, Generalized Anxiety Disorder. 
The reason that the client has also teen given this 
diagnosis is that he has difficulty in relaxing, he has obvious 
strained face, he experiences cold sweats, he feels anxious a 
great deal of the time, tends to worry and ruminates about past 
events, experiences temper outbursts. 
Last diagnosis: 205.01, Alcohol abuse continuous. 
Mr. Oman has-been utilising alcohol as a means of heloino 
him cope with the pain he is experiencing. He does have a history 
over the last ten to twelve years of being a heavy drinker, he 
had a DUI apparently six years ago, will spend a great deal of 
timewdown at the bar where his wife works, and is reoorted to 
continually drink alcohol there in getting drunk as much as four 
times weekly^ 
/3i.ci*l Service Workej 
JP/bj 
S5-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational 
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In eases of permanent total dis-
ability the employee ahall receive 662 i 7c of his average weekly wages tt 
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66**% of the 
•tate average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less 
than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a maxi-
mum of four such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 66*3 7c of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However, 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more 
than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by the commission of 
permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until 
such time as the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandator;' that the industrial commission of 
Vtah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under 
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the 
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-6S (1), not 
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; 
the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally follow the 
practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation 
of employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of voca-
tional rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the 
industrial commission 0/ Utah and in writing that such employee has fully 
co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to 
rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not 
be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be paid to such 
employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66'-/3% of his average weekly 
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66-/3 7c 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $35 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and 
$5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not to exceed 
66% 7c of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-6S (1), for such 
period of time beginning with the time that the payments (as in this sec-
tion provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier termi-
nate and ending with the death of the employee. No employee, however, 
ahall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate 
with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein. 
ADDENDUM K. 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 85-1-68 (1) shall 
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $50 per week. 
Commencing July 1,1974, all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5.1949, and were receiving compensation bene-
fits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 35*1*68 (1) at a rate sufficient 
to bring their weekly benefit to $50 when combined with employer or in-
surance carrier compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the 
vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission 
of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the 
commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be 
heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabili-
tation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in ail other cases, howerer, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided 
in sections 35-1*65, 55-1*66 and this section, including loss of function, in 
excess of 662.37c of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week for 312 weeks. 
History: X*. 1917, ch. 100, | ? 8 ; C. Z* 
1917, 13139; X* 1919. ch. S3, f 1; ft. 8. 
1933. 42-1-43; L. 1937, eh. 41, 11; 1939, 
Ch. 51, | 1 ; C. 1943, 42-1-63; X* 1945, eh. 
•5 , f 1; 1949, eh. 52, SI; 1951, eh. 55, { 1 ; 
Xt55, eh. 57, S i ; 1957, ch. 62, §1; 1959, 
Ch. 55, $1; 1961, eh. 71, S i ; 1963, eh. 49, }1; 1965, eh. SS, §1 ; 1967, eh 65, §1: 969, ch. 66, | 5; 1971, eh. 76, 16; 1973, 
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